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Introduction
Richard B. Freeman, Joseph R. Blasi, and 
Douglas L. Kruse
Almost half of American private-  sector employees participate in “shared 
capitalism”—employment relations where the pay or wealth of workers 
is directly tied to workplace or ﬁ  rm performance. In many of these ﬁ  rms 
employees also participate in employee involvement committees or work-
place teams that help management make decisions regarding the economic 
activities of the ﬁ  rm. Employees in other countries have similar types of pay 
and work arrangements but the US is arguably the world leader in shared 
compensation and decision-  making arrangements (Freeman 2008).
This book presents papers from the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER)’s Shared Capitalism Research Project that investigated 
the shared capitalist part of the US economy.1 To determine how shared 
capitalist arrangements work and how they aﬀect workplace outcomes we 
developed two new data sets and analyzed some existing data sets. Our main 
data innovation was a survey of over 40,000 employees in fourteen compa-
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1. On the development of shared capitalism in diﬀerent sectors of the US economy with 
related research, see Blasi (1987) on ESOPs, Blasi (1988) on employee ownership in privately-
 held  ﬁ  rms, Blasi and Kruse (1991) on employee ownership in publicly traded corporations, 
Kruse (1993) on proﬁ  t sharing, and Blasi, Kruse, and Bernstein (2003) on the high tech-
nology sector with special emphasis on stock options and the 100 largest ﬁ  rms that created 
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nies and 323 worksites that have a variety of shared capitalism programs. 
While our sample of companies is small for a quantitative study, it is large for 
a qualitative case study, and while the ﬁ  rms are a nonrepresentative sample 
of those engaged in shared capitalist activities, they mirror how shared 
capitalism is implemented in most mainstream US corporations. About 
90 percent of the workers surveyed are in ﬁ  ve Fortune 500 multinational 
companies where the employee stock ownership accounts for a minority 
stake of the ﬁ  rm’s equity, where workers elect no board representatives, and 
where the employee stock ownership is combined with cash proﬁ  t sharing, 
gain sharing, or broad-  based stock options. About 10 percent of the work-
ers surveyed are in nine medium sized ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership 
Plan) ﬁ  rms with under 1,000 workers that are in most cases 100 percent 
employee- owned but where nonmanagement employees at times have some 
board representatives but not a majority of any of the boards.
We asked workers about their experiences with their ﬁ  rms’ programs and 
other aspects of their jobs. We also placed questions about shared capitalism 
on the nationally representative General Social Survey (GSS) in 2002 and 
2006.2 Since standard labor force surveys do not ask workers a comprehen-
sive set of questions about shared capitalist forms of pay, the GSS provides 
the best available estimates of the extent of shared capitalism among US 
workers.
Our analyses show that shared capitalism modes of compensation are 
spread broadly throughout the US economy and that shared capitalism is 
linked to worker behavior likely to raise productivity and proﬁ  ts, such as 
reduced turnover and greater willingness to work hard. We also ﬁ  nd that 
shared capitalism is linked to outcomes that beneﬁ  t workers, such as better 
pay, job security, and perceived positive relations with the employer. Workers 
with more intensive shared capitalist programs report that co-  workers are 
more interested in the ﬁ  rm’s performance and are more cooperative than 
workers in ﬁ  rms with less intensive programs.
But while shared capitalism appears beneﬁ  cial for workers and ﬁ  rms on 
average, our analyses also show that it is not a magic potion that cures all 
economic ills. There is considerable variation in its eﬀects across ﬁ  rms. The 
positive eﬀects are contingent on an array of human resource policies and 
workplace practices that give workers freedom from close supervision and 
create good labor-  management relations.
Many economists and others are uneasy about shared capitalist arrange-
2. The General Social Survey is conducted by the National Opinion Research Center of 
the University of Chicago and supported by the National Science Foundation, among other 
funders. It is widely viewed as one of the most valuable surveys for research purposes in the 
United States. The Shared Capitalism segment appears in the 2002 and 2006 survey and is being 
planned for the 2010 survey. All the data are publicly available from the General Social Survey 
or repository libraries at various universities.Introduction    3
ments. One reason for their concern is the free rider problem that arises 
whenever someone gains only part of the reward from their activity. Why 
should an individual give full eﬀort in an N person ﬁ  rm if he or she gains 
only 1/  Nth of the payoﬀ from that eﬀort? It makes rational “prisoners’ 
dilemma” sense to shirk and reap rewards from the eﬀort of others. By the 
free rider argument, shared capitalism should not succeed in motivating 
workers to do better. Another reason for concern is that shared capitalism in-
creases economic risk by linking individuals’ employment and wealth/ income 
to the performance of their employer. When Enron went belly-  up its work-
ers lost not only their jobs but their retirement and other savings held in 
company shares. Similarly, when United Airlines went bankrupt, the airline 
pilots and machinists who had received majority ownership were losers in 
the capital market as well as in the labor market. By inducing workers to 
invest in their ﬁ  rm, shared capitalism can run counter to the investment 
precept that one should not put “all the eggs in one basket,” though there 
are ways to limit the risk through diversiﬁ  cation of portfolios.
Our analysis oﬀers some answers to these concerns. On the free rider 
issue, we examine the hypothesis that workers’ co-  monitoring of fellow 
employees in shared capitalist ﬁ  rms is an important deterrent to free rid-
ing. Using a novel set of questions on workers’ ability to observe co-  worker 
activity and their response to shirking, we ﬁ  nd that the vast majority of 
workers have a good idea of what fellow workers are doing (a prerequisite 
for co-  monitoring); that workers paid shared capitalist compensation are 
more likely than other workers to act against “shirking” by fellow workers; 
and that worker co-  monitoring or anti-  shirking behavior is associated with 
higher worker eﬀort and better workplace performance. Shared capitalist 
ﬁ  rms seemingly create a cooperative workplace culture that combats the free 
rider problem inherent in any group incentive pay scheme.
With respect to risk, we found that many workers are highly risk-  averse 
but that even many highly risk- averse workers prefer to receive some of their 
pay through shared capitalist arrangements. Given plausible risk aversion 
parameters and the thickness of asset markets, we estimate that by diver-
sifying their portfolios, workers can hold a moderate amount of wealth in 
their employer without suﬀering signiﬁ  cant losses of utility due to risk. The 
average amount of share ownership in our data is on the order of the esti-
mated tolerable level of risk, though there are workers who hold too much 
of their wealth in their ﬁ  rm. Less risky cash proﬁ  t sharing or stock options 
can also be combined with reasonable levels of share ownership in order to 
moderate risk.
The ﬁ  ndings in the book show that shared capitalism is an important 
part of the US economic model. Its magnitude and success merits increased 
attention from businesses, unions, policymakers, and social scientists, and 
from economic science more broadly.4        Richard B. Freeman, Joseph R. Blasi, and Douglas L. Kruse
What Exactly is Shared Capitalism?
We use the term “shared capitalism” to refer to a diverse set of compensa-
tion practices through which worker pay or wealth depends on the perfor-
mance of the ﬁ  rm or work group.
Employee ownership. The extent of employee ownership varies from work-
ers having complete ownership of the ﬁ  rm to owning a majority stake or 
a nonnegligible minority stake, usually through a trust or other legal entity 
that votes the shares as a group. In the US one major form for employee 
ownership is the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP), which federal 
legislation established to allow companies to contribute money to a trust to 
buy worker shares or to borrow money to fund worker ownership and then 
repay in installments from company revenues. Under this approach, work-
ers gain an ownership stake without investing their own money to buy the 
stock. The ESOPs where workers make wage or beneﬁ  t concessions, while 
often the subject of major media coverage, actually represent the exception, 
not the rule, in this sphere. Partnerships are another major form of employee 
ownership.
Individual employee stock ownership. This refers to situations in which 
workers buy shares in the ﬁ  rm and vote those shares privately. American 
workers can purchase stock through their company 401k plan, a retirement 
plan in which they make pretax contributions from their pay. Sometimes 
ﬁ  rms match employee contributions to 401k plans with company stock. 
Workers can also buy shares of their ﬁ  rm on the stock market. Sometimes 
ﬁ  rms subsidize part of employee purchases of shares outside of retirement 
plans through Employee Stock Purchase Plans, which typically oﬀer stock 
at a 10 to 15 percent discount to market. The United Kingdom tax code 
privileges this form of employee ownership.
Proﬁ  t sharing pays workers speciﬁ  ed shares of proﬁ  ts when the ﬁ  rm makes 
money. The payments can be cash bonuses on a yearly or more frequent 
basis or can take the form of placing the workers’ share of proﬁ  ts in a retire-
ment plan (called “deferred proﬁ  t- sharing”). Some ﬁ  rms pay proﬁ  t-  sharing 
bonuses in company stock, so what is received as a proﬁ  t share becomes 
employee ownership. Some proﬁ  t- sharing plans are formal, laying out a for-
mula linking proﬁ  ts to worker payments (sometimes after a certain threshold 
is met, and sometimes with an additional discretionary component), and 
other proﬁ  t- sharing plans are fully discretionary, in which companies decide 
at the end of each year how much should be given to workers. In this book 
we use a broad deﬁ  nition, counting as proﬁ  t sharing all bonus plans in which 
the payments depend in some way on company performance.
Gain sharing oﬀers workers payments based on the performance of their 
work units rather than of the whole enterprise. These systems often mea-
sure performance in productivity or cost saving at a particular work site. 
One group of workers can beneﬁ  t from their eﬀort even if the ﬁ  rm does Introduction    5
poorly or if other groups of workers are not meeting their targets. Nonproﬁ  t 
enterprises, including government agencies, can do gain sharing while they 
cannot readily engage in proﬁ  t sharing.
Stock options are a hybrid between proﬁ  t sharing and employee own-
ership. A stock option gives the employee the right to buy stock at a set 
price anytime during a speciﬁ  ed period following the granting of the option. 
The employee gets the upside gain of a rise in the share price without the 
downside risk of losing part of their investment. Unlike company stock, 
stock options are not purchased with employee savings unless they are used 
for wage substitution. High technology companies began granting stock 
options to a broad base of employees in the 1960s and 1970s (see, for ex-
ample, Beyster and Economy [2007]). Start-  ups without the resources to 
match the pay packages of large ﬁ  rms found that they could attract young, 
highly educated workers through granting shares or options. In the 1990s to 
2000s some managers abused stock options for themselves by “backdating” 
the option to a period when shares were lower, which runs counter to the 
professed intent of options—to give managers incentives to make decisions 
that increase the long-  run value of the ﬁ  rm and thus its share price. When 
stock prices fell greatly other managers rewrote options at lower stock prices, 
which encouraged excessive risk- taking as it reduced the loss to management 
of poor performance.
By “shared capitalism” we do not include all performance-  based pay, or 
all pay at risk. There are a variety of pay systems based on individual perfor-
mance (e.g., piece rates, commissions), and some forms of pay may simply 
be risk-  sharing tied to external indicators (e.g., stock market indexes). We 
restrict the term “shared capitalism” to plans that tie worker pay or wealth 
to the performance of their own workplace, whether at the level of the work 
group, establishment, or company.
There are substantive diﬀerences among these forms of sharing the re-
wards and risks of business. Employee ownership can in theory give workers 
the power to make decisions that shareholders have in capital-  owned ﬁ  rms. 
Beginning with Benjamin Ward (1958) and Evsey Domar (1966), economists 
have modeled how worker- owned enterprises might operate compared with 
other ﬁ  rms. Those models predict that the employee-  owned ﬁ  rm will hire 
fewer workers and respond diﬀerently to changes in prices of output than 
traditional ﬁ  rms, at least in a short or medium time period. If ﬁ  rms can freely 
enter an industry, these very unique models predict that worker-  owned and 
capital- owned  ﬁ  rms will reach the same equilibrium output and employ-
ment. Individual share ownership does not have clear consequences for the 
way the ﬁ  rm operates since individual workers almost never own enough 
shares to inﬂ  uence management decisions.
None of the fourteen ﬁ  rms in our study are “worker-  owned” in the strict 
sense of this theoretical literature. None have nonmanagement employees 
representing a majority of their boards, including those that are 100 per-6        Richard B. Freeman, Joseph R. Blasi, and Douglas L. Kruse
cent employee-  owned. All of them have hierarchical management teams. 
Management was chosen by boards with the input of outside investors and 
ﬁ  nancial institutions or advisors, not by the workers themselves. Workers 
participate in the ﬁ  rm’s life mostly at the level of their jobs and departments.3 
Shared capitalism as it has developed in the United States and elsewhere 
diﬀers greatly from the simple economic models that have made some econo-
mists uneasy about the way these businesses operate.
Proﬁ  t sharing and gain sharing give workers rewards for success without 
the ownership authority to make management decisions. This diﬀerence 
underlies Martin Weitzman’s (1984) model of the share economy, in which 
proﬁ  t sharing makes the cost of labor completely ﬂ  exible and gives ﬁ  rms the 
incentive to hire as many workers as are willing to take jobs. Heuristically, 
a ﬁ  rm that pays workers a ﬁ  xed share of proﬁ  ts views workers as compa-
rable to salespersons paid commissions. Since employing more sales workers 
should increase total sales, proﬁ  t-  sharing ﬁ  rms should want to hire as many 
persons as will accept jobs. Sales and proﬁ  ts will rise even as the increased 
number of sales workers drives down sales per employee and the earnings 
of workers. Firms will also have the incentive to hang onto workers if the 
demand for the ﬁ  rm’s output goes down, leading to Weitzman’s prediction 
that an economy of proﬁ  t-  sharing ﬁ  rms will have lower levels of unemploy-
ment and greater macroeconomic stability.4
What uniﬁ  es ownership, proﬁ  t sharing, gain sharing, and stock options as 
“shared capitalism” is that in each case workers’ compensation depends on 
the performance of their ﬁ  rm or work group. It is group incentive pay rather 
than individual incentive pay. By deﬁ  ning shared capitalism in this way, we 
exclude another prominent form of worker ownership of capital—pension 
fund ownership of shares (Drucker 1976).
3. A random sample of ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership Plan) ﬁ  rms that tend to have 
high concentrations of employee ownership, and from which nearly all majority employee-
  owned and 100 percent employee-  owned ﬁ  rms come, found that the ESOP Trustee (often a 
bank trustee) votes the shares, not the individual workers. In only 14 percent of the cases do 
the employee owners instruct the trustee of the Employee Stock Ownership Trust how to vote 
their shares in board elections (National Center for Employee Ownership [NCEO] 2007, 87). 
Our interviews with the major national associations of these ﬁ  rms could not elicit one example 
of an ESOP ﬁ  rm where nonmanagement employees made up a majority of a ﬁ  rm’s board of 
directors. The corporate governance patterns of majority and 100 percent employee-  owned 
ﬁ  rms in the United States appear to have converged with the general pattern: single slates of 
directors put forward by management that are ratiﬁ  ed by shareholders or their “trustees” with 
virtually no examples of corporate governance insurgency on the part of worker owners. In 
fact, among publicly-  traded ﬁ  rms in the United States it is hard to ﬁ  nd more than a few cases 
where nonmanagement worker owners have even one or two board representatives.
4. Weitzman’s predictions have received some support in examinations of ﬁ  rm behavior, but 
the theory is complex to test at this level (requiring good information on average proﬁ  t share 
as a percent of pay, the extent of substitution with ﬁ  xed pay, the size of the demand shocks 
faced by ﬁ  rms, and whether a positive demand shock is following a previous negative shock 
or represents new growth) (Kruse 1993, 1998). The theory would be more appropriately tested 
by the (unlikely) comparison of an economy of proﬁ  t-  sharing ﬁ  rms to an economy of non-
 proﬁ  t-  sharing ﬁ  rms.Introduction    7
Shared capitalism is often linked to shared decision making. Employee-
 owned stock comes with at least limited voting rights, but beyond these legal 
rights employees are often given increased involvement in diﬀerent types of 
workplace decision making. There is a strong logic to this: while shared capi-
talism provides the incentive to improve performance, increased involvement 
in decision making can provide the means to do so. Providing shared capital-
ism without at least some involvement in decision making may have little 
or no eﬀect on performance, and may in fact have bad eﬀects if employees 
see the shared capitalism simply as a device to shift income risk onto them. 
Likewise, many ﬁ  rms use employee involvement in decisions to help improve 
a variety of outcomes, but if workers are not ﬁ  nancially beneﬁ  ting from the 
results of their decisions through some type of shared capitalism then any 
higher productivity may be diﬃcult to sustain. The empirical overlap and 
possible complementarities between shared capitalism plans and employee 
involvement in decision making is a major theme that will be discussed at a 
number of points in this book.
Why Shared Capitalism is Attractive
Some economists, Alfred Marshall, John Bates Clark, and James Meade, 
among others, have looked favorably on shared capitalist arrangements. So 
too have many business leaders and governments.5 The United States and 
many other countries give tax incentives to promote worker ownership. The 
EU directed attention to proﬁ  t sharing and employee ownership in its 1991 
Promotion of Employee Ownership and Proﬁ  t Sharing report (the “Pepper 
Report”). It called on member states to promote participation by employed 
persons in proﬁ  ts and enterprise performance. France requires that some 
ﬁ  rms pay part of wages in proﬁ  t shares. What makes shared capitalism 
attractive to economists, business, labor, and governments is the belief that 
when workers have a stake in the ﬁ  nancial performance of the ﬁ  rm, they will 
create better outcomes than if the workers were just “paid hands.”
The outcome that receives the most attention is productivity. Tying work-
ers’ pay to workplace performance is expected to induce workers to increase 
eﬀort, commitment, and willingness to share information, and to decrease 
turnover and absenteeism, particularly in teamwork settings where coop-
eration and information sharing among employees is important. The resul-
tant growth of productivity and proﬁ  ts creates the potential for the prover-
bial “win-  win” situation, with workers and the ﬁ  rm sharing the beneﬁ  ts of 
5. Fear of communism and unionism led John D. Rockefeller of Standard Oil and other 
corporate leaders to form a Special Conference Committee that later became The Conference 
Board, whose agenda included proﬁ  t sharing and employee stock ownership, though perhaps 
more to gain the loyalty of workers, than in the belief that these systems would improve com-
pany performance. In its early days, Princeton University’s Industrial Relations Section studied 
this phenomenon (see Foerster and Dietel 1927).8        Richard B. Freeman, Joseph R. Blasi, and Douglas L. Kruse
the increased production. Most quantitative studies of shared capitalism 
es  timate its impact on productivity by matching information on company 
stock and proﬁ  t plans to publicly available measures of performance. They 
ﬁ  nd the expected positive relationship between shared capitalism and per-
formance.6 But studies show considerable variation in the eﬀects of shared 
capitalist arrangements on outcomes, with many workplaces having little 
or no improvement in output or labor productivity. The average eﬀect is 
positive because shared capitalism is rarely associated with low or declining 
productivity.
The use of stock options and share ownership in high tech start- ups in Sili-
con Valley and elsewhere directs attention at the putative impact of shared 
capitalism on another key aspect of ﬁ  rm performance—its innovativeness. 
Employees whose pay or wealth is tied to the ﬁ  rm’s performance are more 
likely to suggest ideas for innovative products or production technologies, 
and to help implement these ideas.
In one of the earliest analyses of employee ownership, John Bates Clark 
argued that, “All the workmen with their employers constitute, collectively, 
a good entrepreneur” (1886, 183–  84), but he was just beginning to review 
supporting evidence for this claim.7 Similarly, to the extent that shared capi-
talism distributes decision making and the rewards from good performance 
among a larger group of employees than conventional ﬁ  rms, shared capi-
talist ﬁ  rms could be less prone to the malfeasance in corporate governance 
that marred corporate America in the 1990s to 2000s. More workers will 
know how the ﬁ  rm is truly doing and management will have a smaller incen-
tive to cook the books on its behalf since it is sharing ownership with work-
ers as well as with nonemployee shareholders. To the extent that proﬁ  t shar-
ing helps stabilize employment or that employee ownership gives employees 
a means to resist job-  destroying takeovers or downsizing, it also has the 
potential to ameliorate ﬂ  uctuations in employment.
What about the eﬀect of shared capitalism on workers? Many analysts and 
6. See reviews in Weitzman and Kruse (1990); Bullock and Tubbs (1990); Kruse (1993); 
OECD (1995); Doucialiagos (1995); Welbourne and Mejia (1995); Kruse and Blasi (1997); 
Blasi, Kruse, and Bernstein (2003); Kaarsemaker (2006a, 2006b), and Freeman (2007), plus 
additional recent studies cited in chapter 4.
7. Taking the opposite side, the ﬁ  rst President of the American Economic Association, 
General Francis Amasa Walker, who later became head of MIT, expected worker shares in 
performance would increase worker eﬀort, but thought it could possibly fail because of the 
“lack of an entrepreneur” (1876). Walker was referring to companies that were mainly owned 
by their workers without professional management and not to established capitalist ﬁ  rms with 
signiﬁ  cant employee ownership, of the type found in the United States today. John Bates Clark 
saw a role for employee ownership and proﬁ  t sharing in ﬁ  rms but did not rule out it also having 
outside investors. Bates was associated with a working group at Johns Hopkins University that 
began to collect information on employee ownership and proﬁ  t sharing in various regions of 
the United States (Adams 1888) and publish it in the journal of the new American Economic 
Association (see, for example, Bemis [1886].) Soon after, established ﬁ  rms with professional 
managers, for example, Procter & Gamble in 1887, began to use proﬁ  t sharing and employee 
stock ownership more widely.Introduction    9
observers believe that shared capitalism improves employee well-  being. It 
gives workers greater participation on their jobs, is associated with increased 
skills, and improves labor- management cooperation and job satisfaction. By 
giving workers across the economic spectrum a share of proﬁ  ts and company 
stock, moreover, shared capitalism could perhaps play a role in mitigating 
the rising inequality in income and wealth that has characterized the United 
States since the 1970s and 1980s. The reason is that capital income has risen 
more than wages, with labor’s share of national income falling in the 2000s, 
so that those with a share of business proﬁ  ts or appreciation in the value of 
equities or real estate have done better than wage earners.8 If the boards of 
directors of companies with some employee ownership see a business pur-
pose for sharing proﬁ  ts and ownership more widely, employee ownership 
may also help control runaway CEO pay.
Finally, many advocates of shared capitalism view it as a logical extension 
of political democracy. Albert Gallatin, Jeﬀerson’s Secretary of Treasury 
and one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, promoted proﬁ  t 
sharing for that reason.9 Investment banker and political economist Louis 
Kelso contributed one of the earliest analyses along these lines (Kelso and 
Adler 1958) and developed the ESOP with Senator Russell J. Long. The 
National Center for Employee Ownership broadened this analysis to focus 
on the implications of a variety of equity plans for company objectives 
and performance (see Rosen, Case, and Staubus [2005]). Senator Russell J. 
Long favored incentives for ESOPs in federal law to broaden the wealth 
distribution and to give more Americans direct stakes in the economic sys-
tem. Political scientists argue that democratic workplace structures produce 
skills that workers can carry to social and political activities outside the 
workplace.10
But there are potential weaknesses to shared capitalist arrangements. The 
skills needed to manage a ﬁ  rm with signiﬁ  cant employee ownership and 
proﬁ  t sharing are likely to diﬀer from the skills needed to manage a standard 
ﬁ  rm, which may limit the ability of those enterprises to recruit top managers, 
8. The overall return to capital, reﬂ  ecting proﬁ  ts and company stock values, has risen since 
the 1970s while inﬂ  ation-  adjusted wages for middle-   and low-  income workers have stagnated 
(Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto 2007, 81, 85, 119, 121).
9. Gallatin wrote that the “democratic principle upon which this Nation was founded should 
not be restricted to the political processes but should be applied to the industrial operation” 
(quoted in US Senate 1939, 72).
10. Pateman (1970); Mason (1982); and Dahl (1985). See Dow (2003, 23–  44) for a review 
and discussion of these and other perspectives. Three states have centers that work with mostly 
local groups of companies with meaningful employee ownership, such as the Ohio Employee 
Ownership Center (see Logue 2002), the Beyster Institute at the University of California at San 
Diego, and the Vermont Employee Ownership Center. Several nonproﬁ  t think tanks have con-
tinued to develop political economic analyses and agendas on shared capitalism among them, 
the Kelso Institute, directed by Patricia H. Kelso; the Carey Center for Democratic Capitalism, 
organized by Ray Carey (2004); and the Center for Economic and Social Justice, founded by 
Norman Kurland (2004). A small US Federation for Worker Coops also exists.10        Richard B. Freeman, Joseph R. Blasi, and Douglas L. Kruse
although this issue has not been studied. Firms that choose shared capital-
ist structures to gain the tax breaks associated with forms such as ESOPs 
may fail to get the economic gains that accrue to ﬁ  rms that introduced them 
for business reasons. Some on the left have criticized shared capitalism as 
simply a management trick to speed up work and eﬀort or transfer more 
risk to workers.
A balanced assessment of shared capitalism must take account of its 
drawbacks as well as its virtues. For example, while it could expand capital 
income for the middle class, how would the issue of risk be addressed? To be 
helpful to participants, moreover, any analysis should also consider possible 
ways to limit the drawbacks and strengthen the virtues.
The NBER Project
At the heart of this book are the two new surveys of workers referenced 
earlier. These surveys are fully described at the end of this introduction, but 
here we give a brief overview. The NBER company survey administered 
80 to 100 questions to workers in fourteen ﬁ  rms and 323 work sites who 
had some shared capitalism modes of compensation.11 All of the ﬁ  rms have 
some sort of broad- based employee ownership plan, but the plan types vary: 
eight have standard ESOPs, one has a 401(k) ESOP, four have Employee Stock 
Purchase Plans (ESPPs), and three have 401(k)’s with company stock. Eleven 
of the ﬁ  rms have broad-  based proﬁ  t-  sharing plans, while ﬁ  ve have broad-
  based stock option plans. One has a 401(k) plan that prohibits investments 
in company stock as too risky, using options and proﬁ  t sharing instead. Our 
survey garnered 41,206 employee responses, which makes this the largest 
single data set on workers in shared capitalist ﬁ  rms. Most of the workers 
(31,994) were based in the United States. The other countries are represented 
because three US multinationals participated in the study and encouraged 
their workers around the world to take the survey. In many of these coun-
tries, the workers have access to shared capitalism comparable to that of 
the US workers. The companies vary in industry group and size. Eight are 
manufacturers, seven with a workforce ranging from 250 to 5,000, and one 
large multinational manufacturer with approximately 40,000 to 75,000 em-
ployees.12 There are two high technology ﬁ  rms, one with a workforce on 
the order of 25,000 to 50,000 and one with a workforce of close to 1,000 
employees. There is one large national ﬁ  nancial services ﬁ  rm with a work-
force of 10,000 to 20,000. There are three service ﬁ  rms with workforces of 
approximately 500, 2,000, and 11,000 employees. Three of the ﬁ  rms are in 
the Fortune 500.
11. We included special questions of concern to each participating company and provided 
them analysis of those questions gratis.
12. We give ranges so as not to risk someone identifying the ﬁ  rms.Introduction    1 1
Initially, we sought to survey paired comparison competitor companies 
for each company in our data set, but we found that this was a fruitless 
endeavor. Many ﬁ  rms similar to those in our sample have some shared capi-
talist compensation programs as well—proﬁ  t sharing instead of employee 
ownership or gain sharing instead of proﬁ  t sharing. Managers in ﬁ  rms that 
had no programs did not ﬁ  nd attractive the idea of being controls for a 
competitor. In any case, the shared capitalist arrangements diﬀered enough 
among our fourteen ﬁ  rms and among workers and establishments within 
those ﬁ  rms to allow us to analyze the eﬀects of these modes of compensation 
and other management labor practices on outcomes.
The principle drawback of the NBER ﬁ  rm survey is that it is a self- selected 
nonrandom sample of US establishments. To the extent that our questions 
relate to issues that face all ﬁ  rms and reﬂ  ect basic human nature, there are 
reasons to expect any ﬁ  ndings to generalize to a broader population. The 
empirical study of management and ﬁ  rm behavior and much of psychology 
is replete with in- depth and useful analysis of nonrandom samples, often of 
just a single ﬁ  rm or person. Still, we sought a way to address the selectivity 
problem. Our solution was to apply to the board of the General Social Sur-
vey at the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago 
in order to place a special module on shared capitalism on the nationally 
representative General Social Survey (GSS) in 2002 and 2006, with a sample 
of 1,145 employees in for-  proﬁ  t companies in 2002, and 1,081 employees 
in 2006. We placed questions on the GSS about the incidence of shared 
capitalism and replicated several key questions from the NBER company 
survey, such as whether workers observed how fellow employees performed 
and how they reacted to someone not working as hard as they should. Thus, 
the GSS provides a validation check on some results in the company sur-
vey. It also provides information on the “control” group of workers with-
out shared capitalist arrangements that we could not obtain from our ﬁ  rm 
surveys.
The Main Findings
As an introduction to what the reader will ﬁ  nd in the remaining chapters 
of this book, in the following we summarize the main ﬁ  ndings in the form 
of six cross cutting “take away messages.” Exhibit 1 lists each of the mes-
sages and gives some related information on the underlying ﬁ  ndings. To see 
how the researchers obtained the ﬁ  ndings and to assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of the analyses that developed them, we direct the reader to the 
chapters themselves.
1.      Shared Capitalism is a Signiﬁ  cant Part of the US Economic Model
For many years most economists viewed shared capitalism as a niche part 
of the capitalist system. Worker- owned ﬁ  rms, ﬁ  rms with signiﬁ  cant minority 12        Richard B. Freeman, Joseph R. Blasi, and Douglas L. Kruse
employee ownership stakes, or proﬁ  t sharing might attract the interest of a 
small band of aﬁ  cionados but most of the profession viewed the topic as too 
narrow and small to be worth broad scholarly attention. Many expressed 
suspicion about the seeming positive eﬀects of shared capitalism on eco-
nomic performance. One comment we often received was, “If this stuﬀ is 
as good as some of the research indicates how come all ﬁ  rms don’t choose 
employee ownership/  proﬁ  t sharing or grant stock options to all workers?” 
Exhibit 1  Six “take-  away” ﬁ  ndings on shared capitalism
1. Shared capitalism is a signiﬁ  cant part of the US economic model.
  Almost half of workers have some form of shared capitalist pay.
  It has grown rapidly in the 1980s–2000s.
    Shared capitalism is also signiﬁ  cant in the United Kingdom and is growing in other 
advanced countries.
    Shared capitalism can increase wealth for workers at lower and middle income levels.
2. Worker co-  monitoring helps shared capitalist ﬁ  rms overcome incentives to free ride.
  Most workers can observe work activity of co-  workers.
  Many take action against shirkers.
  Shared capitalist compensation increases the likelihood of acting against shirkers.
    Combining shared compensation and advanced personnel and labor policies has an even 
larger eﬀect on worker eﬀorts to discourage shirking.
3. The risk of shared capitalist investments in one’s employer is manageable.
    Portfolio theory suggests employee ownership can be part of an eﬃcient portfolio as long 
as the overall portfolio is properly diversiﬁ  ed.
    Some workers have invested excessively in shares of their own ﬁ  rm, contrary to the 
precepts of diversiﬁ  cation, but most workers have modest amounts of employee 
ownership within the ranges suggested by portfolio theory.
    Less risky forms of shared capitalism such as cash proﬁ  t sharing and stock options where 
workers are paid market wages, or company stock is not ﬁ  nanced by worker savings, 
can be prudently combined with riskier forms where workers purchase stock.
4. Shared capitalism improves the performance of ﬁ  rms.
    It is associated with greater attachment, loyalty, and willingness to work hard; lower 
chances of turnover; worker reports that co-  workers work hard and are involved in 
company issues; and worker suggestions for innovations.
    Shared capitalism is most eﬀective when combined with employee involvement and 
decision-  making and with other advanced personnel and labor policies.
5. Shared capitalism improves worker well-  being.
    It is associated with greater participation in decision-  making; higher pay, beneﬁ  ts, and 
wealth; greater job security, satisfaction with inﬂ  uence at the workplace, trust in the 
ﬁ  rm, and assessment of management; and better labor management relations practices.
    Shared capitalism is most eﬀective when combined with employee involvement and 
decision-  making and with other advanced personnel and labor policies.
6. Shared capitalism complements other labor policies and practices.
    Firms with shared capitalist compensation are more likely to have other worker-  friendly 
labor policies and practices
    Combinations of shared capitalist pay and other policies, such as devolving decision- 
making to employees, wages at or above the market rate, and lower supervisory 
monitoring, produce the largest beneﬁ  ts for workers and ﬁ  rms.Introduction    1 3
Another line of critical commentary argued that shared capitalism missed 
the boat because what really matters in most businesses is top management: 
“If you want to know why ﬁ  rms succeed, study the superstar CEOs, not 
regular employees. The CEOs are paid huge sums because they are the key 
to enterprise performance.”13
The evidence on the extent and impacts of shared capitalist arrangements 
presented in this volume refutes such dismissive views. As noted in the open-
ing paragraph, almost half of US employees participate in some form of 
shared capitalism. The 2006 GSS estimates that 47 percent of workers are 
covered by at least one such form, with 38 percent having proﬁ  t sharing, 
27 percent having gain sharing, 18 percent owning their company’s stock, 
9 percent holding company stock options, and 5 percent receiving company 
stock options in any year. Based on these ﬁ  gures, shared capitalism covered 
53.4 million American workers.
There is also a substantial amount of overlap among shared capitalism 
plans. Over three-  fourths of workers who own company stock also have 
proﬁ  t sharing or stock options, and workers with proﬁ  t sharing often have 
other programs as well. These patterns suggest that some ﬁ  rms combine 
the longer-  term incentives associated with employee stock ownership or 
deferred proﬁ  t sharing in retirement accounts with shorter-  term incentives 
of cash proﬁ  t or gain sharing bonuses and stock options, presumably to 
maximize worker commitment and eﬀort over diﬀerent time horizons and 
also to combine more and less risky shared capitalist practices.
The data also show that shared capitalist arrangements cover much of the 
economy, though they are more prevalent in some sectors than others. For 
example, employee ownership ranges from 10 percent of employees in non-
computer services to 43 percent of employees in computer services. How-
ever, contrary to some notions that it is more adaptive to service companies, 
employee ownership and stock options have a moderately high incidence in 
manufacturing. It is more common in larger establishments, in jobs where it 
is easier to see how other workers perform, and in jobs with teamwork, low 
levels of supervision, employee involvement, employer-  sponsored training, 
and job security. Union members are less likely than nonunion members to 
be part of proﬁ  t- sharing and gain- sharing plans, but are more likely to hold 
company stock and stock options (Kruse, Blasi, and Park, chapter 1).
Shared capitalism was not always such a large part of the US economic 
system. In 1886 John Bates Clark wrote that the test of the economic eﬃcacy 
of what was then called cooperation was how the ﬁ  rms grew relative to other 
types of enterprises. For decades, shared capitalist modes of compensation 
13. Identifying superstar business leaders is diﬃcult and ﬁ  nding out what they do and 
whether the huge amounts they make reﬂ  ect their marginal product is even more diﬃcult. 
One eﬀort to identify the stars on the basis of business awards and to examine their activities 
ﬁ  nds that after the CEO gets fame as a superstar, performance falls and shareholders lose. See 
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and work as a whole did not expand their share of the market, justifying the 
dismissal of these institutions as interesting but unimportant aberrations. 
However, important exceptions appeared throughout American history: 
Pillsbury dominated ﬂ  our production in the 1800s with a very public empha-
sis on proﬁ  t sharing and Procter & Gamble dominated soap and related 
cleaning products in the late 1800s and 1900s with a very public emphasis 
on proﬁ  t sharing and later employee ownership (on Pillsbury, see Blasi and 
Kruse [2008]). But from the 1970s to the present, shared capitalist modes of 
compensation have grown rapidly. Data from diverse administrative sources 
shows that shared capitalism increased its reach in the economy in the latter 
part of the twentieth century (Dube and Freeman, chapter 5, ﬁ  gure 5.1). 
While some of this growth—of ESOPs, in particular14—depends on tax 
advantages given to that form, ﬁ  rms introduced other modes of shared capi-
talism without any such support. Shared capitalism has also increased its 
importance in the United Kingdom (Bryson and Freeman, chapter 6) and in 
many other advanced countries, though it seems most successful at spread-
ing in the United States. Shared capitalism has met Clark’s market test.
2.      Worker Co-  Monitoring Helps Overcome Free Riding
The notion that workers will co-  monitor themselves when their pay de-
pends on the performance of the work group and act to reduce free riding 
behavior has long been in the air in discussion of employee ownership and 
proﬁ  t sharing.15 If worker A’s pay depends on how worker B performs, then 
A might be expected to intervene when B is not working up to speed. What 
was missing was evidence that co-  monitoring is extensive and that it helps 
overcome free-  riding and in so doing contributes to the performance of 
shared capitalist enterprises.
The co-  monitoring modules in the NBER fourteen ﬁ  rm survey and in 
the GSS survey ﬁ  ll some of this lacuna in knowledge (Freeman, Kruse, and 
Blasi, chapter 2). Asked how well they could observe what co-  workers were 
doing at their workplace, most workers reported that they had good knowl-
edge of how co-  workers performed. About two-  thirds rated observability 
above seven on a scale from zero to ten. Asked what they would do if they 
saw a fellow employee not working up to speed, about one- third of workers 
14. Between 1975 and 2005 the number of workers covered by just ESOP plans alone 
increased from 250,000 to 10,150,000. This does not include the many other types of employee 
ownership, proﬁ  t and gain sharing, and broad-  based stock options that have also grown.
15. See Bonin and Putterman (1987) and Nalbantian (1987, 26). Tracing the idea back fur-
ther, Columella, the most important historian of Roman agriculture in the ﬁ  rst century AD, 
described how free tenant farmers who had access to the full proﬁ  ts of their labor were more 
productive than other forms of labor when the owner of the lands was not available to monitor 
the work on the lands directly. Columella also stressed the importance of the owner treating the 
worker courteously and with goodwill while being ﬂ  exible and respectful of their rights, and 
having a long- term relationship with the free tenant farmers. (See Columella 1941, Book I: VI, 
79–  83.) We acknowledge the assistance of Professor Heinrich von Staden of the Institute of 
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reported that they would speak to the shirker or report the behavior to a 
supervisor. Many said that they had done that in the past. Critical to our 
analysis, proportionately more workers paid by some form of shared capital-
ism said they would act against a shirker than did other workers. Workers 
with larger proﬁ  t-  sharing or gain-  sharing bonuses and those who recently 
received a stock option grant were the most likely to so act.
Looking at self-  proclaimed motivation, workers paid under shared capi-
talist compensation were more likely than other workers to explain their 
intervention on the grounds that the shirking behavior was costing them 
money. In establishments where workers as a group reported more anti-
  shirking behavior, they also reported that co-  workers worked harder and 
were more encouraging to each other, which produced a more eﬀective facil-
ity, than did workers in other establishments. Finally, our data show that 
anti-  shirking behavior and the eﬀect of shared capitalism on that behavior 
depend in important ways on other workplace labor practices and policies—
a point we develop as take away message six following, as it runs through 
virtually every analysis in the book.
As we were conducting our survey of the workers of one company, 
serendipity provided a natural experiment that gives us an independent 
“before/  after” test of conclusions based on cross-  section comparisons of 
workers with more/  less shared capitalist pay. One ﬁ  rm announced that it 
was going to introduce a new proﬁ  t-  sharing plan shortly after its workers 
took our survey. We asked if we could conduct a follow-  up survey after the 
ﬁ  rm put in the new scheme. The ﬁ  rm agreed, which gave us an exciting and 
unanticipated natural experiment. There were two outstanding diﬀerences 
between the before and after surveys: ﬁ  rst, the proportion of employees who 
said they would talk to shirking co- workers went up; second, the proportion 
who said that they would do so because shirking aﬀected their bonus went 
up also. There was no diﬀerence in the other relevant responses.
Our analysis illuminates only part of the co- monitoring story. It does not 
explore in depth the factors that lead one person to act against a shirker 
instead of seeking to free ride oﬀ of someone else’s intervening. It does 
not measure free riding behavior before and after co-  monitoring becomes 
important. What it does do is demonstrate that co-  monitoring is real, mea-
surable, and responds to the incentives of shared capitalist compensation. 
It is also possible that the increased co-  monitoring of workers can allow 
companies with shared capitalism and supportive work practices to cut their 
supervisory budget, thus creating savings in labor expenses that might aﬀect 
productivity. This is another issue that needs to be explored in depth.
3.      The Extra Risk of Shared Capitalism is Manageable
Some analysts view risk as the Achilles Heel of shared capitalism. Workers 
in shared capitalist ﬁ  rms invest too much of their wealth in the ﬁ  rm, contrary 
to the principle of diversiﬁ  cation, and thus take on too much risk for their 16        Richard B. Freeman, Joseph R. Blasi, and Douglas L. Kruse
own good. Evidence that a sizable number of workers in the United States 
place large fractions of their wealth in company stock shows that this is a 
real problem. In a survey of 401(k) plan participants Hewitt and Associ-
ates found that more than 27 percent of the nearly 1.5 million employees 
surveyed who could invest in company stock had 50 percent or more of their 
401(k) plan assets invested in those shares (Sammer 2006). In the NBER ﬁ  rm 
sample, about 20 percent of workers clearly held too much of their wealth in 
their ﬁ  rm to meet any plausible diversiﬁ  cation strategy (Blasi, Markowitz, 
and Kruse, chapter 3). The reason workers invest heavily in their own ﬁ  rm 
is not because they are risk lovers. Most workers in the NBER survey are 
risk averse, and the more risk averse are less likely to want to participate in 
shared capitalist modes of compensation than other workers. Nevertheless, 
workers seem to ﬁ  nd the notion of being in an ownership or shared capitalist 
position at their workplace exceedingly attractive. Two-  thirds of the most 
risk averse employees want shared capitalism as part of their pay package 
(Kruse, Blasi, and Park, chapter 1).
Blasi, Kruse, and Markowitz (chapter 3) ask whether the risk in shared 
capitalism makes shared capitalism unwise for most workers or whether the 
risk can be managed to limit much of the loss of utility from holding the 
extra risk. They create an index of ﬁ  nancial security based on how much 
each worker’s wealth represents relative to their annual salary and whether 
the worker has reason to believe that the ﬁ  rm substitutes shared capitalist 
compensation with the associated risk for normal ﬁ  xed wages. Workers who 
feel ﬁ  nancially insecure exhibit less of the positive outcomes associated with 
shared capitalism and are less interested in receiving more proﬁ  t sharing or 
employee ownership in their workplaces than other workers.
Portfolio theory suggests that any risky investment—including stock in 
one’s company—can be part of an eﬃcient portfolio as long as the overall 
portfolio is properly diversiﬁ  ed. Someone with considerable assets in their 
ﬁ  rm should invest other parts of their portfolio in assets negatively cor-
related with the ﬁ  rm’s share prices. The loss of utility from the diversiﬁ  ed 
portfolio should be balanced against the gains from shared capitalism to 
determine the “optimal” investment strategy. In the case of 401(k)’s, in 2006 
16 percent of ﬁ  rms that oﬀer company shares in 401(k) plans chose to limit 
the amount of investment in their shares or eliminate it as an option alto-
gether (Sammer 2006). Blasi, Kruse, and Markowitz stress that an example 
of a better strategy for the ﬁ  rm would be to personalize individual portfolios 
on the basis of worker characteristics and preferences. Financial advisors 
with information on the worker’s entire investment portfolio could develop 
investment strategies that would diversify the portfolio in ways consistent 
with individual risk preferences. Given estimates of risk aversion parameters, 
workers could prudently hold up to 10 to 15 percent of their assets in owner-
ship or related ﬁ  nancial linkage to their ﬁ  rm with only a modest loss in utility 
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behavior seems to depend on other workplace labor practices and policies. 
Combining less risky forms of shared capitalism such as proﬁ  t sharing and 
stock options with reasonable amounts of employee stock ownership and 
complementary work practices captures many of the positive impacts of the 
research results while minimizing some of the jeopardy. Aside from limiting 
the overall amount of employee stock ownership to tolerable amounts, one 
important method to reducing risk is to avoid ﬁ  nancing employee stock 
ownership with worker savings or wage substitution, since our ﬁ  ndings show 
that workers respond poorly to wage substitution.
4.      Shared Capitalism Improves the Performance of Firms
The sine qua non in most economics and business discussions of shared 
capitalism is that it improves the performance of ﬁ  rms. Four chapters in this 
volume examine the relation between shared capitalist modes of pay and the 
economic outcomes of ﬁ  rms. Chapters 4 and 7 use the NBER ﬁ  rm survey 
and the GSS survey. Chapter 5 uses two other data sets for the United States 
and Chapter 6 uses a data set for the United Kingdom to estimate the impact 
of shared capitalism on ﬁ  rm outcomes. By estimating similar models with 
diﬀerent data sets and in the UK as well as in the US we test the general-
ity and robustness of our ﬁ  ndings. Results consistent across data sets and 
economies presumably reﬂ  ect the most fundamental aspects of economic 
behavior. Results that vary across data sets/  countries suggest more subtle 
relations, in which unobservable factors may be inﬂ  uencing the observed 
patterns.
Blasi, Freeman, Mackin, and Kruse (chapter 4) ﬁ  nd that measures of 
shared capitalist pay are associated with a host of workplace outcomes ben-
eﬁ  cial to ﬁ  rms in the NBER ﬁ  rm and GSS surveys. More workers report that 
they are “not likely to search for a new job,” “would turn down another job 
for more pay,” have “loyalty to the company,” and are “proud to be working 
for the employer” when they are paid with shared capitalist compensation 
than otherwise. The workers with shared capitalism are also more likely to 
report that “co-  workers work hard,” that they personally “are willing to 
work harder to help the company,” that “co- workers have enough interest in 
company issues to get involved,” and are more likely to make suggestions to 
improve the business. The only outcome that is adversely linked with shared 
capitalism is number of days absent, which is higher with shared capitalist 
compensation than otherwise, but not when shared capitalism is accompa-
nied by complementary workplace practices.
To illuminate the motivation behind the positive worker responses to 
shared capitalism, we asked workers on the NBER survey how their desire 
to improve the business success of their employer would be aﬀected by vari-
ous forms of shared capitalist incentives. Employees said that cash incentives 
and stock options would motivate them the most, followed by shares in the 
ESOP. Respondents said that they would be motivated less if the shared 18        Richard B. Freeman, Joseph R. Blasi, and Douglas L. Kruse
capitalist policy involved buying shares with company discounts and said 
they would be motivated the least by buying shares in the open market. The 
implication is that the context or form in which the ﬁ  rm makes its shared 
capitalist compensation greatly inﬂ  uences how shared capitalist pay aﬀects 
behavior. Consistent with this, Blasi, Freeman, Mackin, and Kruse show 
that the eﬀects of shared capitalism on the diverse outcomes given before 
vary depending on other labor policies and practices.
Dube and Freeman (chapter 5) examine the links between modes of shared 
compensation in pay and employee involvement and other forms of shared 
decision making with various measures of productivity in the 1994– 95 Work-
place Representation and Participation Survey (WRPS) that asked workers 
about their workplace activities and modes of compensation, and in the 2003 
California Establishment Survey that asked ﬁ  rms about compensation and 
decision- making practices. They ﬁ  nd weaker links between shared capitalist 
modes of pay—when examined alone—and worker behavior likely to ben-
eﬁ  t ﬁ  rms than are found in the NBER and GSS surveys. Shared capitalist 
pay has positive but generally statistically insigniﬁ  cant eﬀects on behavior 
likely to raise ﬁ  rm output. Since every ﬁ  rm has a set of workplace practices, 
looking at the combination of shared capitalism with such practices is the 
key to our analysis. The labor practice that has a big eﬀect on behavior is an 
employee involvement committee, which increases employee participation 
in decision making. Shared capitalist forms have their impact on outcomes 
by augmenting the eﬀect of involvement committees. For instance, in the 
WRPS an employee involvement committee by itself increases the prob-
ability that a worker will likely stay with the ﬁ  rm by 0.10 percentage points, 
whereas combined with proﬁ  t sharing and employee ownership, the eﬀect 
is increased to 0.18 percentage points (chapter 5, table 5.4). Similarly, in the 
establishment-  based data set, having an employee involvement committee 
by itself increases productivity by 0.12 percentage points, whereas combined 
with proﬁ  t sharing and employee ownership, the productivity eﬀect nearly 
doubles to a 0.23 percentage point gain.
In the late 1990s the United Kingdom enacted tax laws that privileged 
employee share ownership at the expense of proﬁ  t-  related pay, which it had 
previously tax-  advantaged. One reason for the change was the belief that 
ﬁ  rms were exploiting the proﬁ  t- related pay system by claiming the tax break 
when in fact they were not truly creating pay that varied with proﬁ  ts. Most 
studies of shared capitalism linked the mode of wage payment to manage-
ment perceptions of the productivity of their workplace and found mod-
estly positive eﬀects, which, however, diﬀered over time and among studies. 
Bryson and Freeman (chapter 6) supplement management reports on labor 
productivity with data on sales per employee and value added per employee 
data for establishments in the 2004 British Workplace Employment Rela-
tions Survey (WERS) in the period following the change in tax laws. They 
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ity while other forms of shared capitalism have modest and generally not 
signiﬁ  cant eﬀects. But, as in analyses of US data, the biggest eﬀects occur 
when shared capitalist forms of pay are combined with policies that increase 
worker decision making. They reference a UK Treasury study of a much 
larger sample of ﬁ  rms that yields consistent results.
As information and knowledge work have moved to the forefront of eco-
nomic activity in advanced economies, it is important to determine how 
well, if at all, shared capitalism ﬁ  ts in this “new economy.” The NBER sur-
vey contained a module of questions focused on innovative activity by 
workers. It asked workers, for instance, whether they “would be willing to 
be more involved in eﬀorts to develop innovative products and services” 
and whether in their ﬁ  rm “innovative ideas are carefully considered and 
fairly evaluated.” Using the largest company in the NBER dataset, with 
over 27,000 employee respondents and 280 diﬀerent work sites in twenty-
  two countries, Harden, Kruse, and Blasi (chapter 7) examine the relation 
between workers’ engagement in innovative behavior and shared capitalist 
rewards. Workers with shares in the ﬁ  rm perceive a more innovative culture 
and have a greater willingness to engage in innovative activity. The combi-
nation of shared capitalism and high performance workplace policies had 
the strongest impact on innovation culture and willingness to innovate. This 
is true for both a measure of coverage by diﬀerent policies, and a measure 
of the eﬀectiveness of high performance policies in one’s immediate work 
group or team.
In sum, diﬀerences in the source and type of data notwithstanding, these 
chapters tell a consistent story that supports and enriches the earlier pro-
duction function analyses of the relation between shared capitalism and 
company performance of ﬁ  rms, and show that its eﬀects vary with other 
aspects of the ﬁ  rm’s policies and practices.
5.    Shared  Capitalism  Beneﬁ  ts Workers
The four chapters of the book that examine the relation between shared 
capitalism and worker well- being show that shared capitalism beneﬁ  ts work-
ers along a host of dimensions. Shared capitalism is associated with better 
working lives and greater wealth relative to otherwise comparable work-
ers paid by conventional means. Most workers appear to have suﬃciently 
accurate information about shared capitalist compensation to motivate the 
various behavioral responses found throughout the book. At the same time, 
because shared capitalism does not cover many of the lowest paid workers 
in society it does little to reduce earnings inequality at those income levels 
in our society.
To begin with, workers with shared capitalist modes of pay report bet-
ter outcomes on both the NBER ﬁ  rm survey and the GSS in such areas 
as participation in decisions, management treatment of employees and 
supervision, formal and informal training opportunities, pay and beneﬁ  ts, 20        Richard B. Freeman, Joseph R. Blasi, and Douglas L. Kruse
co-  worker relations, job security, and labor management-  relations broadly 
(Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi, chapter 8). Proﬁ  t sharing is most consistently 
linked to such positive outcomes, though gain sharing, stock options, and 
employee ownership also aﬀect outcomes positively. For some outcomes 
the positive eﬀect is related to the worker being covered by a policy (e.g., 
being eligible for proﬁ  t sharing, or being an employee- owner), but for other 
outcomes the eﬀect is tied to the size of the ﬁ  nancial stake involved (e.g., size 
of the most recent bonus, or value of employer stock or potential proﬁ  t on 
stock options). Workers report higher job satisfaction when shared capital-
ism is combined with high performance work practices and low supervision, 
and report high participation in decisions and satisfaction with participation 
under similar circumstances. By contrast, the combination of close supervi-
sion with shared capitalism has negative eﬀects on almost every outcome. 
And the impacts of shared capitalism are diluted for workers who believe 
that they are paid below the market rate for their job. This presumably re-
ﬂ  ects worker concern that shared capitalism has replaced ﬁ  xed pay with less 
desirable variable pay. In the WRPS, employee involvement has a greater 
impact than shared capitalist forms on worker satisfaction related outcomes, 
as it did on productivity, with shared capitalism substantially augmenting 
the eﬀect of involvement on such outcomes as satisfaction with inﬂ  uence at 
the workplace, job satisfaction, trust in the ﬁ  rm, and assessment of man-
agement (Dube and Freeman, chapter 5). Overall the results in the various 
studies support the idea that workers gain by sharing, but that the eﬀect 
depends on other workplace policies as well.
Workers’ knowledge of the beneﬁ  ts their ﬁ  rm oﬀers them (Gustman and 
Steinmeier 2001; Chan and Stevens 2003) and of labor protections more 
broadly (Freeman and Rogers 2006) is often sparse and in some cases inac-
curate. In the case of pension rights, Chan and Stevens have found that inac-
curate understanding of pension systems leads some workers to choose their 
retirement in ways against their self-  interest: they choose optimally on the 
basis of their inaccurate knowledge of the plans. Given this ﬁ  nding, Budd 
(chapter 9) examined whether employees in the NBER ﬁ  rm survey had accu-
rate information about the shared capitalist forms of compensation at their 
ﬁ  rm by comparing their reports to company information about the plans. 
This comparison found that 18 to 25 percent of employees reported involve-
ment in company plans that diﬀered from company reports on whether they 
should or should not participate on the basis of the characteristics of the 
plans. At ﬁ  rst, this seemed consistent with the pension results as reﬂ  ect-
ing employee ignorance about the participation, which should dampen the 
eﬀects of company plans on ﬁ  rms and workers. But at our research confer-
ence, company representatives said they were unsure about who is covered by 
their own plans, particularly at the establishment level. Thus, the diﬀerences 
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reﬂ  ect both inaccurate worker information and management uncertainty 
about the implementation of plans.
Stories about ordinary workers who became millionaires through shares 
in a small start- up or a growing ﬁ  rm that prospered abound in Silicon Valley 
and related places. Surely most workers in shared capitalist enterprises are 
not so lucky, but employees with ownership stakes do develop on average 
greater wealth as a result of their ownership than do employees in other 
types of enterprises. In the NBER ﬁ  rm survey employee-  owners have an 
average stake of nearly $62,000; in the GSS employer owners report nearly 
$48,000 in wealth from their ﬁ  rm. At the time the surveys were taken, stock 
option holders had an average $283,000 in potential stock option proﬁ  ts if 
their options could be sold. While in some cases these stakes substitute for 
other wealth, Buchele, Kruse, Rodgers, and Scharf (chapter 11) indicate 
that employee ownership does not generally come at the expense of pay 
and other beneﬁ  ts and appears to add to employees’ wealth on average.16 
Comparisons of the distribution of stock between the NBER company data 
and national data show that broad- based employee ownership plans expand 
stock ownership for workers in the middle of the distribution.17 Employee 
ownership constitutes about 5 percent of the median employee’s wealth in 
the NBER companies, which means that it can have only a modest impact 
on the overall wealth distribution, but at the same time does not give the 
median worker an unduly risky portfolio.
If all workers were equally covered by shared capitalist modes of pay and 
if ﬁ  rms with shared capitalist compensation had lower inequality among 
their employees than other ﬁ  rms, then shared capitalist pay would likely be 
associated with lower overall inequality. In fact, shared capitalist arrange-
ments are disproportionately distributed in the economy. While there is little 
diﬀerence by gender in participation in these plans, African- Americans and 
men with disabilities are less likely to be paid by shared capitalism than 
other workers. The ﬁ  nancial values of capital income accounts are also 
lower for some of these groups. The primary reason for this stratiﬁ  cation is 
the diﬀerent distribution of persons among occupations. At the same time, 
shared capitalism and the employee involvement that often accompanies it 
appear to aﬀect similarly the behavior and attitudes of workers with diﬀerent 
demographic characteristics, as found by Carberry (chapter 10). Thus, ﬁ  rms 
16. Even Frederick Taylor, whose system of scientiﬁ  c management emphasized high supervi-
sion and low participation by workers, strongly held the notion that “Men [and women] will not 
do an extraordinary day’s work for an ordinary day’s pay.” He spent much of his life searching 
for the simple premium on top of normal pay that would spur workers to greater productivity 
even in the absence of an engaging corporate culture (Kanigel 1997, 212–  13).
17. Workers may have gotten lucky with good performance of their employee-  owned stock, 
but these results suggest that even if the stock had performed poorly, they would have been 
no worse oﬀ without the stock since there was little or no substitution with pay, beneﬁ  ts, or 
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can expect reductions in turnover, increased loyalty to the ﬁ  rm, increased 
willingness to work hard, and related behaviors to improve if shared capital-
ist pay arrangements were extended to groups underrepresented in current 
plans.
6.      Shared Capitalism Complements Other Labor Policies and Practices
The single overriding empirical result in this volume, which shows up in 
virtually all outcomes and data sets, is that combinations of policies—shared 
capitalism, employee involvement, and other positive labor practices—are 
complementary. There are some independent eﬀects of shared capitalism 
but it is the combination of compensation and labor policies that seems to 
be the key feature of shared capitalism’s success.
The evidence for the complementary eﬀect is twofold. First, we ﬁ  nd that 
ﬁ  rms with shared capitalist pay are more likely than other ﬁ  rms to have 
employee involvement committees and to devolve decisions to workers and 
other policies associated with high performance workplaces (Kruse, Blasi, 
and Park, chapter 1; Dube and Freeman, chapter 5; Bryson and Freeman, 
chapter 6). Second, as noted in preceding summary points, we ﬁ  nd that the 
combination of shared capitalist pay and other policies has a greater impact 
on outcomes than policies taken separately. Workers are more likely to 
undertake anti-  shirking behavior when shared capitalism is combined with 
higher trust in management, low levels of supervision, high performance 
work policies, and wages at or above market levels (chapter 2). Workers 
in workplaces with poor employee relations and a lack of high performance 
work policies view their economic position as inherently more risky and 
are less positively inclined toward shared capitalist modes of pay (chapter 
3). Workers with shared capitalist practices and high performance work 
policies, low levels of supervision, and ﬁ  xed wages that are at or above the 
market level had lower expected turnover, higher loyalty, higher willingness 
to work hard, and a greater frequency of suggestions (chapters 4, 7). In 
the UK and US establishment production function data, the combinations 
produce higher productivity (chapters 5, 6). Similarly, workers in ﬁ  rms that 
combine shared capitalism with other practices report greater participation 
in decisions, lower levels of supervision, better management treatment of 
employees, formal and informal training opportunities, pay and beneﬁ  ts, 
co-  worker relations, job security, and job satisfaction (chapter 5, 8).
The interaction of the eﬀects of shared capitalism with other corporate 
policies suggests that the various shared capitalist and other policies may 
operate through a latent variable, “corporate culture.”
Conclusion
The ﬁ  ndings summarized previously give a favorable picture of shared 
capitalism. Firms have managed to overcome the incentive to free ride that Introduction    2 3
threatens to undermine any form of group pay and have increased the shared 
capitalist modes of pay to nearly half of the US workforce at the turn of 
the twenty-  ﬁ  rst century. While some workers hold too much wealth in their 
ﬁ  rm, the median worker who receives shared capitalist pay does not do so. 
Diversiﬁ  cation can reduce the potentially excessive risk of linking labor 
market and capital market outcomes in the same ﬁ  rm. The chapters on 
workplace performance show substantial and statistically signiﬁ  cant posi-
tive relations between shared capitalism and almost all outcomes. In most 
cases, the biggest eﬀects come when shared capitalism is accompanied by 
other identiﬁ  able policies. The chapters on worker outcomes tell a similar 
story about the beneﬁ  ts that accrue to workers. Overall, the volume shows 
that shared capitalism works best when it combines monetary incentives with 
employee decision-  making and personnel and labor policies that empower 
and encourage employees.
The shared capitalism vision of the US economy diﬀers in important 
ways from the vision of capitalism as dependent primarily on concentrating 
rewards with superstar entrepreneurs and CEOs and a thin slice of execu-
tives and managers at the top of ﬁ  rms. Our analysis diﬀers in important 
ways from the economic theories that stress the behavior of the superstar 
manager over that of workers more broadly or from theories of the ﬁ  rm 
that hold that proﬁ  ts should go to a central owner for optimal incentives to 
monitor work.18 To the extent that workers monitor workers better than do 
managers, and that shareholders cannot write contracts that align manage-
ment interests with their interests, much less with the interests of workers, 
shared capitalist modes of pay may oﬀer better solutions to principal/ agent 
problems and to the division of the rewards of joint activity than traditional 
capital versus labor divisions. Giving employees shared capitalism with sig-
niﬁ  cant discretion or residual control over how they do their jobs may be 
more eﬃcient than lodging such control in management or shareholders as 
residual claimants, at least in some sectors.
As this summary and ensuing chapters make clear, our research has 
answered some questions about shared capitalist enterprises and highlights 
other important questions that require additional data and research. We 
direct attention in particular to three issues. First, there is the way shared 
capitalist pay and organization of work that empowers workers comple-
ment each other. This seems to reﬂ  ect the elusive concept of corporate cul-
ture, which we view as potentially the latent variable behind the interactions 
between shared capitalism and other policies found throughout the volume. 
Second, there is how co- monitoring helps shared capitalist enterprises over-
come free-  riding tendencies. Our analysis has just scratched the surface of 
this phenomenon, which can potentially illuminate the deep social science 
problem of explaining the seemingly inordinate success of cooperative solu-
18. This theory is stated most prominently in Alchian and Demsetz (1972).24        Richard B. Freeman, Joseph R. Blasi, and Douglas L. Kruse
tions in economic life. Third, there is the way the risk of shared capitalism 
can be minimized when workers do not pay for employee stock ownership 
through reduced wages and lower savings; when less risky forms of shared 
capitalism such as cash proﬁ  t sharing and stock options are combined with 
riskier forms such as company stock; when workers wealth portfolios hold 
a prudent share of ownership in their ﬁ  rm, and the rest of the portfolio is 
diversiﬁ  ed. From the perspective of economic theory, the success of shared 
capitalism engages fundamental mainstream issues pertaining to risk aver-
sion and portfolio theory, game theory and the free rider problem, behav-
ioral ﬁ  nance, and theories of compensation, such as eﬃciency wage theories. 
From the perspective of policy, we hope the volume provides some evidence 
and guidance for business and labor leaders, as well as analysts and poli-
cymakers about ways to think about shared capitalist ﬁ  rms and to devise 
policies to help them contribute to economic well-  being.
Studying Shared Capitalism
In the rest of this introduction we provide an overview of the two main 
surveys used in this book. We discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the 
surveys, the ways in which they complement each other, some of the meth-
odological problems in researching shared capitalism, and the ways we have 
addressed those problems. Readers mainly interested in the results should 
go straight to chapter 1.
The NBER Company Survey
For an intensive look inside companies that use shared capitalism, the 
NBER project members recruited fourteen companies with a variety of 
shared capitalist programs, and employee surveys were conducted over the 
2001 to 2006 period in 323 worksites. We drew up a sample of ﬁ  rms varying 
in size, industry, and type of program, and contacted them in various ways to 
participate. As is usual in this sort of research, we were able to convince only 
some ﬁ  rms to participate. Two ﬁ  rms that agreed to participate were bought 
out by other ﬁ  rms who did not want to cooperate with the study.
The basic characteristics of the fourteen ﬁ  rms are described in table 1 
(only broadly so as not to leave open the possibility of someone identifying 
the ﬁ  rms). All of the ﬁ  rms have some sort of broad-  based employee own-
ership plan, but the plan types vary: eight have standard Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans (ESOPs), one has a 401(k) ESOP, four have Employee 
Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs), and three have 401(k)’s with company stock. 
Eleven of the ﬁ  rms have broad-  based proﬁ  t-  sharing plans, while ﬁ  ve have 
broad-  based stock option plans. Most have combinations of these plans, 
reﬂ  ecting the combinations we observe in the American labor market in 
general (Kruse, Blasi, and Park, chapter 1, table 1.1). While each of these 
fourteen ﬁ  rms has some type of shared capitalist plan, the plans and details 
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within those ﬁ  rms to allow us to analyze the eﬀects of these modes of com-
pensation and other management labor practices on outcomes.
As noted earlier, the companies vary in industry group and size. There 
are eight manufacturers (seven small or medium-  sized and one large), two 
high technology ﬁ  rms (one medium- sized and one large), one large ﬁ  nancial 
services ﬁ  rm, and three service ﬁ  rms (one small, one medium- sized, and one 
large).
Once ﬁ  rms agreed to the survey, we surveyed either all employees or a ran-
dom sample of employees. Each survey had 80 to 100 questions, including 
core questions common across all companies and some questions of special 
concern to each participating company (for which we provided analysis gra-
tis). To help ensure validated questions and useful comparisons, a number 
of the core questions were drawn from other surveys, including questions 
on job security and turnover intention from the General Social Survey, and 
questions on employee involvement from the Workplace Representation 
and Participation Survey (Freeman and Rogers 2006). The core survey 
questions also included new comprehensive measures of every identiﬁ  able 
Table 1  NBER survey companies
   
Broad- based 
proﬁ  t sharing  





  1,000 employees
    Company  1 Yes ESOP No
    Company  2 Yes ESOP No
    Company  3 Yes ESOP No
    Company  4 Yes ESOP  and  ESPP Yes
  1,000–9,999  employees
    Company  5 Yes ESOP No
    Company  6 Yes 401(k)  ESOP No
    Company  7 Yes ESOP No
  10,000 employees
    Company  8 Yes 401(k)  w/co.  stock No
Service/ﬁ  nancial
  1,000 employees
    Company  9 No ESOP No
  1,000–9,999  employees
    Company  10 No ESOP No
        Company 11 No ESPP and 401(k) w/co. stock Yes
  10,000  employees
        Company 12 Yes ESPP and 401(k) w/co. stock Yes
Hi- tech/Internet
  1,000 employees
    Company  13 Yes ESPP Yes
  10,000 employees
    Company  14 Yes ESPP Yes
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form of proﬁ  t, equity, and bonus sharing. Measures of employee ownership 
include participation in ESOPs and ESPPs, company stock in 401(k) plans 
and deferred proﬁ  t-  sharing plans, stock held after exercising stock options, 
stock grants, and open market purchases. The bonus measures cover all 
types of bonuses, including those linked to company performance (proﬁ  t 
sharing), department or team performance (gainsharing), and individual 
performance. Appendix A reproduces the questions and gives descriptive 
statistics for the presence of diﬀerent practices and their intensity (i.e., as a 
percent of salary or wealth). Appendix B describes our summary measure 
of shared capitalism. We create the summary measure because our surveys 
are virtually the only ones that include all forms of shared capitalism and 
remuneration. Given how widespread bundles of shared capitalist practices 
are in the US economy, some past studies may have only measured the vari-
able of interest and ignored other important shared capitalist variables.
Six company surveys were conducted over the web, seven company sur-
veys were done on paper, and one survey was done using both the web and 
paper surveys. The web surveys were on a university-  sponsored server, not 
on the company server, so that workers knew this was not a company activ-
ity. When we administered surveys in person, to protect conﬁ  dentiality the 
surveys were gathered by either members of our team or a committee of 
three nonmanagement employees, who administered them in one room, col-
lected them in sealed envelopes in a box, and brought them immediately to 
an express mail facility and sent them directly to the NBER research team for 
analysis. Workers were informed about these procedures for their protection 
on the cover of each survey. The company response rates ranged from 11 to 
80 percent, with an average of 53 percent across the fourteen companies. A 
total of 41,206 respondents provided usable surveys, in 323 establishments. 
Most of the workers (31,994) were based in the United States, though as 
noted the three US multinationals in the study encouraged their workers 
around the world to take the survey. Most of the workers could be matched 
to speciﬁ  c establishments, enabling some site-  level analysis.
As noted earlier, we initially sought to ﬁ  nd and survey paired compari-
son competitor companies for each company in our data set. This did not 
work out, both because many of the prospective comparison ﬁ  rms also 
had some form of shared capitalism, and because managers in many of the 
ﬁ  rms did not want to simply serve as controls. We nonetheless found that 
there was substantial variation in shared capitalism and complementary 
practices both within and among our fourteen ﬁ  rms, 323 establishments, 
and 41,206 workers, allowing us ample opportunity to explore the eﬀects 
of shared capitalism.
General Social Survey
As noted earlier, the main limitation of the survey of ﬁ  rms is that it is 
based on a self-  selected nonrandom sample of ﬁ  rms. This raises questions 
about the generalizability of the results that must be addressed head-  on. Introduction    2 7
We note ﬁ  rst that these are mainstream companies operating in the highly 
competitive US market, not strange entities operating under peculiar rules 
or regulations (per the worker-  managed ﬁ  rms in old Yugoslavia). To the 
extent that our questions relate to issues that face all ﬁ  rms and reﬂ  ect basic 
human nature, there are reasons to expect the ﬁ  ndings to generalize to a 
broader population. But expectation/  argumentation is not evidence. To see 
if in fact some of the main results from our ﬁ  rm survey hold in a repre-
sentative sample of ﬁ  rms, we arranged to add a special module on shared 
capitalism on the nationally representative General Social Survey (GSS) in 
2002 and 2006 by submitting a research proposal to the board of the GSS. 
The GSS is a national area probability sample of noninstitutionalized adults 
conducted by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of 
Chicago. The GSS started in 1972 and has been conducted every year or 
two since then (currently every other year). It is the major ongoing source 
of information on the changing attitudes and experiences of Americans over 
the past four decades. “Except for the US Census, the GSS is the most fre-
quently analyzed source of information in the social sciences” (http:/  /  www
.norc.org/ gsswebsite/ aboutgss). The 2002 GSS had a sample of 1,145 
employees, and the 2006 GSS had a sample of 1,081 employees, in for- proﬁ  t 
companies. The response rates were 70.1 percent for the 2002 survey and 71.2 
percent for the 2006 survey. The 2010 GSS with related questions is being 
administered as this book goes to press.
We placed questions on the GSS about the incidence of shared capitalism 
and replicated the questions from the NBER company survey on whether 
workers observed how fellow employees performed and how they reacted 
to someone not working as hard as they should. As noted before, we also 
put some standard GSS questions on the NBER survey (e.g., job security, 
turnover intention). Thus, the GSS provides a validation check on some 
results in the company survey, as well as a representative group of workers 
without shared capitalism that can serve as “controls” for our NBER ﬁ  rm 
surveys. An additional advantage of the GSS is that in both 2002 and 2006 
there were special work modules with a wide variety of questions on work 
attitudes and experiences, allowing a broader look at the relationship of 
shared capitalism to workplace variables. The GSS questions analyzed in 
this book are described in appendix A. These data are available on the GSS 
web  site  (http:/ / www.norc.org/ GSSWebsite/  ) and can be readily down-
loaded and analyzed by other researchers. The GSS contains information 
on many aspects of social life that we did not explore, which creates potential 
for other investigators to illuminate the relation of shared capitalism to other 
parts of US society.
Survey Strengths, Weaknesses, and Complementarities
Correlation between variables in nonexperimental survey research does 
not imply causation. There may be a variety of explanations for a positive 
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participation in shared capitalism and feelings of organizational commit-
ment, for example, could reﬂ  ect the eﬀect of shared capitalism on commit-
ment, or the placement of committed employees into positions with shared 
capitalism, or simply the dependence of both variables on a third factor. In 
these latter two cases the shared capitalism variable would be endogenous—
determined by other variables in the system so that we could not reliably 
infer from the statistical association that independent changes in shared 
capitalism would create the observed correlation between the variable and 
organizational commitment.
Many of these problems could be solved by a true experiment, where 
subjects are randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, with the 
treatment carefully constructed and manipulated by the researchers. We 
would certainly like to be able to impose a variety of shared capitalism plans 
on 1,000 randomly-  selected companies, and compare their outcomes to 
those of another randomly- selected 1,000 companies in a control group. As 
nice as this would be from a research standpoint, obviously we have neither 
the authority nor the resources for such a vast experiment. Instead we rely 
on a quasi-  experimental approach (Cook and Campbell 1979), examining 
how naturally-  occurring variation is related to outcomes of interest, while 
attempting to control as well as possible for potential sources of bias. It is 
noteworthy that the largely (though not uniformly) positive outcomes for 
shared capitalism in this book are consistent with laboratory experiments 
comparing behavior in employee-  owned versus conventionally-  owned 
“ﬁ  rms” (collections of randomly-  assigned subjects)(Frohlich et al. 1998). 
Our approach has an advantage over laboratory experiments by showing 
the real-  world existence and relevance of these ﬁ  ndings to actual ﬁ  rms 
and workers. A recent ﬁ  eld experiment provides corroborating evidence by 
randomly assigning proﬁ  t-  sharing plans to three stores in a twenty-  one-
  store fast food company, with the result that proﬁ  ts and productivity rose 
and turnover fell in the proﬁ  t-  sharing stores relative to the control group 
(Peterson and Luthans 2006). By using random assignment, both of these 
studies provide some assurance that the ﬁ  ndings in this book are not due 
to an array of potential biases.
In the rest of this chapter we discuss some of the potential biases more 
thoroughly, and how the studies in this book attempt to minimize them.
Employee-  Reported versus Objective Data
One potential limitation of these data is that almost all of the policies, 
experiences, attitudes, and behaviors are reported by employees, so there 
may be a subjective component that muddies the analysis. Particularly when 
analyzing workplace performance, it is valuable to have objective data—
measures of actual output or turnover behavior, for instance, rather than 
reported productivity or intention to leave a company. Indeed, much of 
the shared capitalist literature has used establishment data to examine such Introduction    2 9
patterns. There have been over 100 studies of workplace performance under 
shared capitalism (reviewed in Weitzman and Kruse [1990], Kruse [1993]; 
OECD [1995]; Doucialiagos [1995]; Kruse and Blasi [1997]; Blasi, Kruse, 
and Bernstein [2003], Kaarsemaker [2006a, 2006b]; and Freeman [2007]). 
These studies show that shared capitalism is associated with better ﬁ  rm per-
formance on average, but that there is enough variation in outcomes so that a 
positive outcome is by no means automatic. This suggests that the eﬀects of 
shared capitalism may be conditioned by a variety of workplace factors such 
as human resource policies, the quality of employee relations, the nature of 
supervision, and how the job is constructed. Rather than do another large-
 scale survey of ﬁ  rms, we wanted to try a new approach, delving more deeply 
into the “black box” of shared capitalism in ways that might illuminate the 
factors that might condition the eﬀects of shared capitalism.
Since relatively few studies have looked at shared capitalism from the 
workers point of view, we designed the NBER project to ﬁ  nd out directly 
from workers how they experience work, and how shared capitalism ﬁ  ts 
into that experience. The workers reported on a number of attitudes and 
behaviors for which they are the only source (e.g., job satisfaction, turnover 
intention, and company loyalty). Of course it would be ideal to have objec-
tive performance data that could be matched to each individual worker, 
but: (a) companies do not have individual-  level objective performance data 
for most jobs; and (b) even if they did have such individual-  level data, we 
could not have matched to survey data without compromising anonymity. 
In their own right, moreover, employee reports are meaningful both as mea-
sures of subjective attitudes and as predictors of future behavior, as shown 
by meta-  analyses of prior studies, which ﬁ  nd that many employee-  reported 
attitudes and behaviors are linked to important outcomes—for example, 
turnover intention predicts actual turnover, and employee engagement 
predicts behaviors that improve objective outcomes (Griﬀeth, Hom, and 
Gaertner 2000; Harter, Schmidt, and Hayes 2003). In sum, our bottom-  up 
approach measures attitudes and behaviors that cannot be easily measured 
in any other way, and that are not purely subjective but are also related to 
behavioral outcomes.
Selectivity Bias
Many of the diﬃculties in reaching valid conclusions in nonexperimental 
research are due to potential statistical bias from self-  selection of respon-
dents. A classic experiment generally removes such selectivity bias by ran-
domly assigning subjects to treatment and control groups (though such bias 
may still occur in who volunteers to be part of the experiment, and who 
drops out before the experiment is done). In ﬁ  eld research like this, a number 
of types of selectivity bias can be at work in: (a) how those who participate 
in the study may be diﬀerent from those who do not; and (b) how those 
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those without the treatment. Selectivity bias can lead to biased conclusions 
regarding the sample being analyzed (internal validity) and problems in gen-
eralizing to the universe of interest (external validity) (Cook and Campbell 
1979). In these two surveys, selectivity bias can operate at both the ﬁ  rm and 
individual levels.
Selectivity Bias in Who Participates in Study
As noted before, the ﬁ  rms agreeing to cooperate with the NBER survey 
are clearly not a random sample of all shared capitalism ﬁ  rms, and there may 
be something “special” about them that inﬂ  uences the results. It is possible 
that some special characteristic of these ﬁ  rms conditions the relationships 
observed in these ﬁ  rms, so that the relationships cannot be generalized to 
other ﬁ  rms with similar policies of interest. For example, perhaps the mana-
gers in the studied ﬁ  rms are especially knowledgeable about how to imple-
ment shared capitalism in an eﬀective way, whereas managers in other shared 
capitalism ﬁ  rms (not part of our study) are not as eﬀective in implementing 
it. Or perhaps the employees in the studied ﬁ  rms especially like shared capi-
talism and respond well to it. Similarly, there may be selectivity bias in the 
types of employees who respond to the survey: perhaps employees who are 
motivated by shared capitalism are more likely to respond to the survey.
Our principal method to check for such selectivity bias in our NBER 
sample is to compare results to those in the GSS national sample to see if the 
relationships hold among other employees with shared capitalism. As will 
be seen, this is largely the case, providing some reassurance that our NBER 
ﬁ  rms and employees are not atypical of other shared capitalism ﬁ  rms and 
employees. Still, at the individual level, it is possible that employees who 
responded to the survey may be unlike nonrespondents in some way, making 
it diﬃcult to achieve valid conclusions and generalize the results. One basic 
method to minimize this bias is to create the highest response rate possible. 
As noted previously, the average response rate across the NBER surveys is 
53 percent, and the response rate for the GSS is 70 percent in 2002 and 71 
percent in 2006, which are all considered good response rates in individual 
survey research. We used two additional methods to check for selectivity 
bias at the individual level in the NBER surveys. In addition to the 41,206 
employees who completed usable surveys, an additional 5,701 started the 
survey but did not complete enough of it to be usable.19 We found that this 
latter “nonrespondent” group had lower average levels of shared capitalism, 
but the relationships between shared capitalism and outcome variables were 
generally similar for this group as for those included in the full analysis.20
19. Surveys were deemed not usable if respondents did not answer at least half of eighteen 
basic job and demographic questions.
20. The nonrespondent group had an average score on the shared capitalism index (described 
in Appendix B) that was 3.5 points lower than for the respondent group. The regressions includ-
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Selectivity Bias in Who Participates in Shared Capitalism
An even thornier type of selectivity bias concerns what types of ﬁ  rms and 
employees choose shared capitalism. Are they also diﬀerent in some other 
way that aﬀects the results? The ﬁ  rms that choose to implement shared capi-
talism may be better- performing companies in general, or have unmeasured 
policies or other qualities that aﬀect the outcomes of interest. One solution 
is to do pre/ post studies that hold constant any ﬁ  xed unobservable qualities 
of the company (e.g., comparing company performance before and after 
the adoption of proﬁ  t sharing as in Kruse [1993] or company performance 
and pay levels before and after the adoption of ESOPs in Kim and Ouimet 
[2008]). In this project we have an example of a pre/  post study in which the 
NBER survey was administered twice at one company, the ﬁ  rst time before 
a proﬁ  t-  sharing plan was implemented and the second time several months 
later after it was implemented. The results are analyzed in chapter 2.
Our primary method of avoiding much of the potential selectivity bias at 
the ﬁ  rm level is to do within-  company comparisons: seeing how outcomes 
diﬀer among workers with greater and lesser amounts of shared capital-
ism while controlling for a variety of job and personal characteristics, and 
eﬀectively holding constant any ﬁ  rm characteristic that is common to all 
workers. In other words, in contrast to the many cross- sectional studies com-
paring ﬁ  rms with and without shared capitalism programs, these results 
here are not biased by unmeasured between-  ﬁ  rm diﬀerences in manage-
ment, policies, or anything else. By comparing to the GSS national sample, 
as noted before, we can be more conﬁ  dent that the relationships we ﬁ  nd 
apply across shared capitalism ﬁ  rms in general. Even if the relationships 
hold among all shared capitalism companies, however, it remains possible 
that they will not generalize to ﬁ  rms without shared capitalism—that is, we 
would not get the same results if we could somehow convince or require all 
ﬁ  rms to have shared capitalism plans.
There may also be selectivity bias in the type of worker who joins a shared 
capitalism ﬁ  rm. Workers who are especially interested in performance- based 
pay, for example, may be especially likely to join shared capitalism ﬁ  rms, and 
these workers may have other special personal qualities that aﬀect their atti-
tudes and behavior at work. There is little direct evidence on this question. 
Weiss (1987) ﬁ  nds that both the initially high and low performers were more 
likely to quit the company after their pay became tied to group incentives—
suggesting that there is some self-  selection in group incentives—but this 
self-  selection imparts no general upward or downward bias to estimates of 
the eﬀects of group incentive systems.
questions at the end of the survey that very few nonrespondents answered. In addition, we 
used information from the “nonrespondent” group to create standard Heckman selection cor-
rections (Heckman 1976), and found little change in the estimated relationships of shared 
capitalism to outcome variables.32        Richard B. Freeman, Joseph R. Blasi, and Douglas L. Kruse
In our NBER companies, all of the employees have chosen to join a ﬁ  rm 
with broad- based shared capitalism, but there may still be systematic within-
 company  diﬀerences between the employees with and without shared capi-
talism. It may be, for example, that employees who display the best attitudes 
are put in positions where they are eligible for shared capitalism plans, and 
the positive link between shared capitalism and attitudes simply reﬂ  ects this 
preexisting individual diﬀerence. Or certain jobs may be deemed appropriate 
for shared capitalism compensation and those same jobs may be structured 
to require certain behaviors (e.g., monitoring co-  workers), but there is no 
causal connection between the shared capitalism and behaviors.
Selectivity bias can result from self-  selection on observable or unobserv-
able variables. The most straightforward method of minimizing selectiv-
ity bias is simply to control for a rich array of observable individual and 
job variables that may determine selection. One advantage of our detailed 
NBER surveys is that we can observe variables that many studies have had to 
treat as unobservable. In addition to standard demographic and job controls, 
we had access to variables available in few or no other studies, such as level of 
risk aversion, closeness of supervision, ease of seeing co-  workers, and total 
wealth. A common supposition, for example, is that workers who choose to 
work in shared capitalism programs have higher tolerance for risk than do 
other workers, and this may be related to a variety of other personal attitudes 
and characteristics that aﬀect responses to shared capitalism. The rich array 
of individual- level variables helps reduce the potential for selectivity bias to 
account for diﬀerences found in the individual-  level analysis.
But there remains the possibility of self-  selection on unobservable vari-
ables—for example, the employees with shared capitalism may simply have 
greater ability or “spunk” or other intangible qualities that aﬀect their atti-
tudes and behavior. One way to control for selectivity bias due to unobserv-
able individual qualities is to do pre/  post comparisons at the individual 
level (e.g., comparing pay and beneﬁ  ts of workers before and after joining 
proﬁ  t-  sharing plans, as in Kruse [1998]), but we are not able to follow indi-
viduals over time with the anonymous NBER surveys or the 2002 and 2006 
cross-  sectional GSS surveys. Another way to deal with selectivity bias is to 
use instrumental variables that substitute a predicted value for the actual 
value of the variable of interest, in order to remove the correlation with the 
error term. This requires ﬁ  nding some exogenous variables that predict the 
variable of interest (e.g., shared capitalism) but that do not directly aﬀect 
the outcome of interest (e.g., response to shirkers). For example, given that 
shared capitalism introduces compensation risk, it is plausible that our mea-
sures of personal risk aversion might serve as exogenous variables predicting 
participation in shared capitalism by workers without directly predicting 
the workplace outcome of interest. We tested risk aversion and a variety 
of other variables as exogenous variables in instrumental variables models, 
but could not identify any that consistently met tests of exogeneity. Without Introduction    3 3
a genuine controlled experiment or some natural experiment that closely 
mimics a controlled experiment econometrics does not enable us to rule 
out the eﬀect of unobserved factors on our results. However, the case for a 
causal eﬀect of shared capitalism is supported by the workers’ own views 
about the eﬀects of shared capitalism (chapters 2 and 4), the one pre/  post 
study (chapter 2), and the detailed controls available in the NBER survey. 
In addition, as noted before, the results in this book are broadly consistent 
with the ﬁ  ndings noted previously from the true experiment of Frohlich et 
al. (1998), where many forms of selection bias were removed by the random 
assignment of subjects.
Ecological Correlation Bias
There is one other diﬃculty that runs through many of the analyses of 
the NBER company data sets that we ﬂ  ag here. The diﬃculty is that cor-
relations obtained at the level of individuals in our data set may not hold 
at the level of worksites where shared capitalist and other labor policies are 
implemented. For example, one worker could report lots of shared capitalist 
pay and work eﬀort at his ﬁ  rm while a co-  worker could report little shared 
capitalism and little eﬀort. The result would be a strong positive correlation 
between shared capitalism and reported eﬀort among individuals in the data 
set but no correlation at the possibly more appropriate establishment level 
of analysis. Readers familiar with the ecological correlation bias (in which 
correlations among aggregate units may not carry over for individuals within 
the units) can view this disaggregation correlation bias as a parallel problem 
in the opposite direction. To deal with it, we aggregated individual worker 
reports into worksite level averages and examined the link between the estab-
lishment level variables. To the extent that some of the individual variation 
within an establishment reﬂ  ects real variation in conditions—for example, 
one part of the establishment has gain sharing or a stock option plan and 
another part does not—the results from the establishment level analysis 
may understate the true eﬀects of shared capitalism while the results from 
analysis of individuals may overstate it. Where appropriate, the chapters test 
the link between shared capitalist pay and outcomes at both the individual 
and establishment levels.
Conclusion on Methodology
These two new surveys represent the most extensive “bottom-  up” ap-
proach to the study of shared capitalism to date, going straight to work-
ers to ﬁ  nd out how they experience and respond to shared capitalism, as 
opposed to the largely “top- down” approach of most prior studies that rely 
on company-  level data that is often manager-  reported or administrative 
data from government data sets created as a result of company reporting 
requirements.34        Richard B. Freeman, Joseph R. Blasi, and Douglas L. Kruse
Neither survey is ideal. The GSS is nationally representative, but has lim-
ited numbers of persons with diﬀerent forms of compensation arrange-
ments, which makes it hard to reach statistically valid conclusions in some 
areas. Because it is a small national sample, workers are likely to all be 
employed by diﬀerent ﬁ  rms so that we view comparisons among workers as 
comparisons across ﬁ  rms. It is not longitudinal. The NBER has a large num-
ber of respondents, but they are taken from a sample of ﬁ  rms that is non-
random. Because the NBER survey covers a small number of ﬁ  rms, much 
of the variation comes from variation among workers within ﬁ  rms, and we 
generally include ﬁ  rm ﬁ  xed eﬀects in analyses to focus on this variation. By 
combining analyses of the small national sample that lives on cross- company 
variation and the larger nonrandom sample of workers from participating 
companies that lives on within-  company variation, we hopefully surmount 
these weaknesses and reach conclusions that have general validity.
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